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Abstract
Starting in 1978, the U.S. banking sector was gradually deregulated in terms of
restrictions on geographical expansion. This paper examines the impact of intrastate
branching deregulation on (state-speciﬁc) self-employment income growth rate. If post-
reform changes in the banking structure led to improved lending to previously un-
derserved (potential) businessmen, their self-employment income would accelerate, as
banks are the prime source of ﬁnance for self-employment. Based on a simple model
adopted from Evans and Jovanovic (1989), it is hypothesized that banking deregula-
tion would particularly impact self-employment of discriminated against social groups.
Consistent with the hypothesis, cross-state evidence suggests that the growth rate of
self-employment income increased after reform, with the eﬀect being more pronounced
for women and non-white minorities at the low end of income distribution. Based on
the obtained results, this paper suggests that more competitive banking environment
after branching reform has mitigated prejudicial discrimination in lending. The analysis
casts light on real eﬀects of banking deregulation, on the eﬀect of consolidation in the
banking sector on individuals targeted by the Equal Credit Opportunity (ECOA) and
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), and on a function of competition in reducing
discrimination.
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This paper empirically shows that removal of bank branching restrictions had a positive im-
pact on self-employment income growth rates for females and minorities at the low end of in-
come distribution. The analysis is based on a simple theoretical model, adopted from Evans
and Jovanovic (1989), showing how improvements in banking can aﬀect self-employment of
previously discriminated groups of the labor force.
Since the late 1970s, the structure of the U.S. banking industry has changed considerably
following deregulation of restrictions on intrastate branching and interstate banking. As
a result, competition and eﬃciency in the banking sector increased. Banks are the prime
source of ﬁnance for the self-employed (Cole and Wolken (1995)).
Self-employment is an alternative to unemployment, providing a way out of poverty.
Moreover, it is one of the sources of upward economic mobility. This is particularly true
for minorities and women to the extent they are subject to discrimination—taste-based or
statistical—in the labor market.1 To become self-employed, one needs to either possess large
asset/wealth holdings or to borrow from a ﬁnancial institution. Relatively poor individuals,
and especially women and minorities among them, are denied credit more often. First of all,
they do not have a lot of assets that may serve as collateral. Second, they are on average
riskier business owners. Third, regulated banks may have just preferred not to ﬁnance
certain groups (i.e., they were employing some taste-based, non-economic discrimination
practices) and could get away with it since there simply was no competition in the banking
industry.
Even though it is prohibited by law to discriminate in lending on the basis of race and
gender and there are several government programs, subsidy plans, and laws that create
an incentive for lending to relatively poor, women, and non-white minorities, these groups
are still ‘underserved’ (i.e., they are receiving much less credit, rejected more often, and if
accepted—charged higher rates and fees).2
Prior to deregulation of branching restrictions, there were two nationwide laws, targeted
to increase lending to underserved communities: the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
in 1974 and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977. The ECOA prohibited
discrimination in lending based on race, gender, marital status, etc., and the CRA created
a set of incentives for companies to invest in local (underserved) communities, which is seen
by many as a potential to decrease discrimination in lending in these markets.
While it is potentially hard to separate the long-run eﬀects of earlier (nationwide)
1Statistical (economic) discrimination is a discrimination based on credit applicants’ potential risk; taste-
based (non-economic) discrimination is a discrimination based on preferences of a lender regarding the
personal (mainly demographic) characteristics of potential borrowers.
2See Section 4 for a more detailed discussion.
1laws targeted at increase in lending to poor, women, and minorities from the eﬀects of
other (de)regulation, this paper exploits the variation between the U.S. states in level
of competitiveness in the banking sector due to deregulation of restrictions on intrastate
branching to test whether there is a diﬀerential impact on historically underserved (possibly
discriminated against) social groups: relatively poor females and minorities.
This study suggests that banking deregulation, whether or not by intention, stimu-
lated self-employment among previously discriminated groups of the labor force. There are
several possible channels through which the eﬀects could take place.
First, banking deregulation led to increased competition in the banking industry.3 If
banks were discriminating against some borrowers based on non-economic factors, according
to Becker (1957), they would be less able to do so as competition increases. Discrimina-
tion adds to the total costs of lending as a certain parameter. Financial institutions that
employed discriminating practices in the regulated industry have higher total costs of trans-
actions than non-discriminators. After branching reform, they would either be driven out
of businesses or restructured so as to reduce the discrimination parameter to its minimum.
Second, following branching deregulation, better-run and more eﬃcient banks grew and
replaced less eﬃcient banks. Operating costs, loan losses, and the share of non-performing
loans decreased.4 This may indicate that improved banks became better able to screen and
identify positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects. If relatively poor women and minorities
had good projects and banks were not able to identify them in the regulated environment,
deregulation could have increased the possibility of their recognition and ﬁnancing.
Third, larger and more diversiﬁed banks emerged following reform. Dick (2006) ﬁnds
that, with removal of geographical restrictions on banking, credit risk increases, as ge-
ographic diversiﬁcation provides banks with a hedge against risk. Moreover, Diamond
(1984) in a theoretical model shows that a large bank’s ability to diversify credit risks
across borrowers reduces the agency cost of lending to risky borrowers. These, in turn,
made banks more prone to ﬁnance risky projects.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) ﬁnds that the ratio of non-performing loans and loan
losses fell after deregulation. My paper shows that the state-speciﬁc aggregate self-employ-
ment income growth of riskier/previously-discriminated individuals increased. Together
these ﬁndings may indicate that banks “learned” how to identify good projects among
those groups of borrowers more than they became more risk tolerant (i.e., the ﬁrst two
eﬀects dominate).
Besides deregulation of the banking industry, several other factors might have inﬂuenced
3See for example Carlson and Mitchener (2005), Stiroh and Strahan (2003), Black and Strahan (2002)
for empirical evidence, and Section 2 below for a discussion.
4See Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Berger and Mester (2003) for empirical evidence.
2small businesses and the self-employed in particular. For example, the Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) provides loan guarantees to qualiﬁed small businesses. Such guarantees
assure the lender that in the event the borrower does not repay the debt and payment
default occurs, the government will reimburse the lender for its loss, up to the certain
percentage of the SBA’s guarantees. This program is the main government tool aimed at
increasing credit availability for small businesses.
If state authorities decided to deregulate their banking system and at the same time
to increase the amount of loans guaranteed by SBA in order to stimulate small businesses,
then the results discussed above would be spurious. As a robustness check, I show that the
main result of the paper—the positive eﬀect of reform on the state-speciﬁc self-employment
income growth of relatively poor women and minorities—holds even after controlling for
the state-speciﬁc amounts of SBA-guaranteed loans per capita.
The results of this paper are potentially important if applied to other countries besides
the United States. Many economies are now committed to removing barriers across banking
sectors. For example, deregulation in the European Union is aimed at having a completely
integrated banking market on both the supply and demand side (Cerasi, Chizzolini, and
Ivaldi (1997)). In Japan, one of the main goals of “Big Bang” ﬁnancial reform is to increase
competition in the ﬁnancial sector (Allen and Gale (2000)). Competition in banking has its
‘pros and cons’ for economic development (see Section 5 for a discussion). This paper helps
to identify an additional ‘pro’ of banking system consolidation and increased competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy presents the
history of U.S. banking deregulation. Section 3 describes trends in U.S. self-employment
and, in particular, stresses the historical self-employment participation diﬀerences by race
and gender. Section 4 gives a brief literature review of discrimination in lending practices.
Section 5 outlines the possible eﬀects of banking deregulation on self-employment formation.
In Section 6, I present the theoretical model. Section 7 describes the data, discusses the
empirical strategy and results. Section 8 concludes.
2 The History of U.S. Banking Deregulation
The U.S. banking regulation has a long history. Since 1920s, banks’ ability to expand
geographically was regulated by state legislation.5 In essence, the banks were prohibited to
branch and establish bank-holding companies both within and across state borders.6
5For example, the McFadden Act of 1927 prohibited intrastate branching as it subjected branching of
national banks to state authority and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
restricted an interstate expansion via bank-holding companies.
6Ever since the U.S. Constitution restricted states’ ability to issue ﬁat money and tax interstate com-
merce, states started using banking as a source of revenue. An example of such source of revenue is a charter
3The legislative regulations have restricted (a) the creation of multi-bank holding compa-
nies, (b) branching by creating a new oﬀspring (de novo branching), and (c) branching by
merger and acquisition. The regulation for creation new oﬀspring oﬃces lasted the longest.
The forms and shapes of resulting banking system varied from state to state bearing the
imprint of a degree to which the states deregulated their banking industry: from a meager
unit banking in some states to a powerful and full-ﬂedged banking industry with intense
and extensive branching in other states. The smaller the degree of branching freedom, the
more dependant local banks became on state economy and, reciprocally, the state economy
became dependant on those banks’ performance.
As regulations were gradually relaxed, the bank sector transformed. Changes in com-
petitive pressures, geographic diversiﬁcation and scale-economies on both the loan- and
deposit-side aﬀected loan losses and the cost of capital, and hence the loan interest rates
charged to borrowers. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) ﬁnd that relaxation of intrastate
branching restrictions improved banking eﬃciency by allowing better-run banks to capture
a larger share of local markets. Following deregulation, low-cost banks grew faster than
under-performing banks and state averages for loan losses and operating expenses fell. Ja-
yaratne and Strahan show that much of these improvements were passed on to borrowers
in the form of lower interest rates on loans.7
Following deregulation, considerable consolidation occurred, predominantly through
mergers and acquisitions. McLaughlin (1995) documents that deregulation of intrastate
branching restrictions caused changes in market structure faster than interstate banking
restrictions. She shows that bank holding companies responded promptly and in large num-
bers to deregulation of branching restrictions by merging previously separated subsidiaries.
Responses to interstate deregulations were slower. In the latter case, bank holding compa-
nies tended to expand intra-regionally, rather than cross-regionally.
Bank branching, in general, increases competition and forces weak banks to exit the
banking system (Carlson and Mitchener (2005)). Stiroh and Strahan (2003) ﬁnd that
intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation created a more competitive envi-
ronment by allowing banks to enter new markets and threaten incumbent banks. Branching
deregulation signiﬁcantly aﬀected only small banks, while interstate banking deregulation
primarily aﬀected the larger banks. Better banks grew and those performing poorly shrank.
Black and Strahan (2002) show that even though the number of small banks began to decline
following banking reforms, concentration in the banking industry did not increase. Banks
fee. Since out-of-state banks do not pay fees to receiving states, there is an incentive to prohibit interstate
bank entrance. Moreover, if banks are restricted to expand geographically even within state borders, there
is a possibility to extract a part of monopoly rent as an additional source of revenue.
7They estimate that average loan rates fell by three-ﬁfths of the reduction in loan losses and only ﬁnd
small, generally statistically insigniﬁcant, increases in bank proﬁtability after deregulation.
4were expanding into new geographical areas instead of combining forces in previously-local
markets.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that GDP and income growth rates increased fol-
lowing intrastate branching deregulation. Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) show that
economic volatility within states decreased after banking deregulation as banks become
more integrated. Dick (2006) ﬁnds that with removal of geographical restrictions on bank-
ing, credit risk increases, as geographic diversiﬁcation provides banks with a hedge against
risk. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen (2005) show that personal income insurance
increased after bank branching reform, suggesting that risk sharing among banks may have
increased. Keeley (1990) argues that banking deregulation led to both increased competi-
tion in the banking sector and decreased banking proﬁts. Berger and Mester (2003) show
that the ratio of non-performing loans decreased following banking reform.
3 Minority Participation in Self-employment
“Owning your own business” seems to be a big part of the “American Dream.”8 Self-
employment provides a way out of poverty and is an alternative to unemployment, especially
for women and minorities who may be subject to discrimination in labor markets.
Minorities on average are less likely to participate in self-employment. The causes may
be their lower wealth/asset holdings, historically lower success rate running a business
(with implications of the higher risk factor), and a possibility that ﬁnancial intermediaries
either charge higher interest rates or completely ration credit to minorities.9 This has been
the topic of emerging theoretical literature (see for example Coate and Tennyson (1992),
Atkeson (1991), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Petrova (2004), and Buera (2003)).
Fairlie and Meyer (2000) study trends in self-employment formation for white and black
men during the twentieth century. They ﬁnd that the gap between black and white self-
employment participation rate is due to lower self-employment rates of blacks in all indus-
tries (i.e., it is not due to the concentration of blacks in low self-employment rate industries,
such as manufacturing for example).
In spite of many government programs intended to promote minority business owner-
ship,10 there are still far fewer black self-employed than white self-employed. Not only are
8The Roper Organization conducted a national telephone interview in 1987 for the Wall Street Journal
to discover the views of the population on the “American Dream.” Fifty-eight percent of the adults replied
that business ownership is an “excellent or good way to get ahead.” For more information see Balkin (1989).
9However, Bauman (1987) ﬁnds the self-employment rate for poor persons who worked full time is twice
that for the entire full-time working population. Most of the time self-employment is seen as a refuge from
unemployment and/or low-wage work (Becker (1984) and Evans and Leighton (1987)).
10The government directly supports disadvantaged and minority-owned businesses in the United States.
During the late 1970s and 1980s, there was an increased growth in the value of federal, state, and local
5African-American men three times less likely to become entrepreneurs, but the transition
out of self-employment is twice as high for blacks compared to whites.11
4 Self-Employment Financing and Discrimination
In 1974, U.S. Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) to eliminate
discrimination in granting credit on the basis of sex and marital status. Two years after
that, an ECOA amendment outlawed discrimination on the basis of race and color, religion
and age. However, there is no direct evidence found in earlier literature that shows that non-
economic discrimination existed before the mid-1970s or that the ECOA actually improved
credit opportunities for anyone.12
On the basis of a growing body of research, though, it is hard to conclude that taste-
based discrimination is just a myth. Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2001), based on
the 1993 NSSBF data set ﬁnd that Hispanic-male owners were denied credit more than twice
as often as white male owners, while African-American owners were denied credit almost
three times as often. Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991) and Munnell, Browne, McEneaney,
and Tootell (1996) ﬁnd that minorities are less likely to obtain a loan than white applicants
even after controlling for the default risk, suggesting that taste-based discrimination against
minorities may be taking place.
In addition to the ECOA, with the similar goal, the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) was enacted in 1977. The intention of the Act was to encourage depository institu-
tions to invest in the communities they operate in, and in particular, in communities with
the low-income and minority neighborhoods. The CRA ratings, that result from periodic
evaluations by federal agencies, are taken into account in considering applications for merg-
ers and acquisitions, among others. Any discriminatory practices by institutions will lower
both the CRA ratings and, as a consequence, the chances to have an application approved.
Economics research shows that in more competitive environment CRA provides local
ﬁnancial institutions with fewer incentives to invest in local communities as the deﬁnition
government contracts reserved for minority owned businesses. Chay and Fairlie (1998) document that self-
employment rates for black men rose dramatically in the 1980s especially in cities in which set-aside programs
were implemented, while the self-employment rates of white men were relatively stable at the same time.
Following the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, set-aside programs propagated nationwide, so that
by the 1980s there were about 36 states involved. There are also many programs that provide educational
assistance for minorities, where they can cheaply learn the basics of business operation.
11See Fairlie (1999), Fairlie and Robb (2003a), and Fairlie and Robb (2003b) for more details.
12In earlier studies, no taste discrimination against females or non-whites is found even before the ECOA
was enacted (Peterson (1981)). Elliehausen and Durkin (1989) also ﬁnd that “ECOA would not have a
substantial impact in changing acceptance probabilities unless tastes for discrimination are widespread and
markets are slow to react.” For more empirical evidence see Durkin and Elliehausen (1978) and Elliehausen
and Lawrence (1988).
6of ‘local’ fades out.13 In more competitive banking sector there would be fewer unexploited
lending opportunities, i.e., less underserved individuals or businesses (or even entire com-
munities).
According to Becker (1957), non-economic discrimination would be more pronounced in
more concentrated markets than in competitive markets. Indeed, Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo
(1998), based on the 1988–1989 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), ﬁnd
that businesses owned by white males are more likely to hold loans than all other groups
if they are operating in more concentrated markets. These diﬀerences are driven by higher
credit denial rates and not by diﬀerences in demand for credit. The diﬀerences in loan-
holdings among diﬀerent demographic groups remain present even after controlling for
information included in standard application forms, credit reports, and lenders’ worksheets.
Such evidence again suggests that there is at least some discrimination present in the U.S.
ﬁnancial market.
It may be the case that females and minorities are just riskier (on average) entrepreneurs
and the fact they get rejected more often is not due to discriminatory practices. Cavalluzzo,
Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2001) show that minority-owned ﬁrms indeed have been much
riskier than others. It is especially true for African-Americans.
Jappelli (1990) ﬁnds a higher proportion of women and non-whites among the rejected
applicants. He also points out that the level of current income, ceteris paribus, seems to
matter the most (not counting for the complete absence of credit history and bankruptcy)
in successful loan application. Small loans are usually short-term and the main requirement
of a lender to initiate this kind of loan is a steady job and suﬃcient income of the borrower.
Low-income borrowers are denied credit more often than relatively high-income borrowers
(Fairlie (2001)). For this kind of individuals any possible (further) discrimination plays a
crucial role.
Peterson (1981) proposes a formal formulation of a bank’s decisions on whether to issue
a loan: Supposedly, banks that discriminate against some particular group of borrowers,
consider the adjusted present value (APV) of a loan instead of a regular present value. APV
is calculated as as a sum of three terms: expected present value of a gain on a loan times the
probability of no default, expected present value of a loss on a loan times the probability
of default, and the discrimination coeﬃcient. The latter term is negative for the group of
potential borrowers against which a lender is discriminating. Any economically justiﬁed
discrimination—based on risk—would be reﬂected in the probability of default and the size
of a possible loss.
13Bostic and Robinson (2003a) show that CRA leads to increased competition in lending; as a consequence,
small community banks decrease CRA and minority lending, while Bostic and Robinson (2003b) ﬁnd an
overall increase in lending to minorities and to the CRA-targeted communities.
75 Financial Development and Self-Employment
Insuﬃciency of credit is the major problem for small business formation. It is shown in the
literature that relaxation of credit constraints is translated into increased probability that
individuals start their own businesses. For example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) ﬁnd that,
in the United States, individuals holding more assets/wealth are more likely to become self-
employed. Sch¨ afer and Talavera (2005) ﬁnd that in several European countries, individuals
receiving windfall gains are more likely to become self-employed. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
and Rosen (1994a) and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994b) ﬁnd that small business
owners who received large inheritances are more likely to succeed in their self-employment
endeavors. Among diﬀerent ways to ﬁnance their businesses, individuals mainly rely on
bank ﬁnancing. Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2001) ﬁnd over 80% of the most
recent small business loans14 came from commercial banks, and 96% came more generally
from ﬁnancial institutions. The vast majority of even the smallest businesses in the U.S. use
banking services. Cole and Wolken (1995) show that 81% of ﬁrms with 0–1 employees use
some commercial banking service, and the percentage is even larger for the larger (small)
ﬁrms. At the same time, small business loans tend to be personally guaranteed (Avery,
Bostic, and Samolyk (1999)). New business, however, also rely heavily on informal sources
of ﬁnancing, such as family savings or borrowing from friends (Huck, Rhine, Bond, and
Townsend (1999)).
It is not clear a priori whether increased competition would beneﬁt or harm small busi-
nesses and self-employment in particular. On the one hand, consolidation and competition
enhances eﬃciency in banking operations. Greater eﬃciency may result in greater credit
availability for all borrowers with positive NPV projects, and especially for previously
discriminated against borrowers among them. On the other hand, small businesses are
known to be ﬁnanced mostly by small (and local) banks and, moreover, to establish long-
term relationships with them. Petersen and Rajan (1994) ﬁnd that borrowers beneﬁt from
establishing strong ties (called relationships) with a lender as it increases ﬁnancing avail-
ability. Lenders who participate in such relationships invest in costly information about the
borrower in the early stages of relationships and extract rent later on. With “relationship-
lending”, lenders collect “soft”,15 non-transferrable, non-quantiﬁable information, such as
the loan oﬃcer’s ﬁrst-hand knowledge of the borrower’s managerial abilities and business
prospects. In more competitive markets, it may be more diﬃcult for both lenders and
borrowers to commit to any long-term relationships (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). With
fewer small banks and fewer relationship-lending practices, credit opportunities for small
14Based on the 1993 NSSBF data set.
15This term was used by DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro (2004) among others.
8and young ﬁrms may go down.
As intrastate branching and interstate banking were allowed, mergers and acquisitions
did lead to a decrease in the number of banks.16 At the same time, the distance between
banks and their small business borrowers increased substantially making it more costly
for banks to collect “soft” information about borrowers. DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro
(2004), however, point out that recent changes in technology (such as the internet, fax
machines, etc.) and greater information availability (e.g., credit bureaus) have allowed
banks to rely more on “hard” information—such as the borrower’s quantiﬁable ﬁnancial
condition—reducing costs or gathering and transferring the information about borrowers,
and making small businesses less opaque.
Black and Strahan (2002) also suggest that consolidation and increased competition
in the banking industry does not have to lead to decreased small business lending. They
argue that competition would foster innovations and drive loan prices closer to marginal
costs. Increased bank size can lower overall lending costs due to several reasons. First,
bigger banks need to hold less capital than several small banks together. Second, delegated
monitoring costs go down as banks become more diversiﬁed (Diamond (1984)).
Indeed, Black and Strahan ﬁnd that there have been more small businesses emerging
(measured by new business incorporations) in the economies of states which removed re-
strictions on banking. They further ﬁnd that, in the regulated environment, states with
more concentrated banking markets had lower rates of incorporations, and these rates rose
after banking reforms. In particular, new incorporations started appearing more as the
share of large banks in a state increased.17
More generally, individuals and ﬁrms can access external funds easier in more developed
ﬁnancial markets. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development
increases the probability that an individual starts his or her own business. It also leads to
entry of new ﬁrms, increases competition, and promotes growth. They used data from Italy
where there were no diﬀerence in regulation across regions and interregional lending was
permitted. In my study, ﬁnancial development diﬀers across U.S. states making it possible
to track the evolution of how ﬁnancial structure aﬀects the health of local economies.
16For example, in 1985 there were about 14,500 banks, and there were about 8,300 banks in the year 2000.
More information is available at www.fdic.gov
17There is a working paper, however, that casts doubt on the results obtained by Black and Strahan (2002).
Wall (2004) points out that there might be some factors that simultaneously determine both deregulation
and the rate of entrepreneurship (see also Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for the factors that drive U.S.
deregulation).
96 Theoretical Model
In this section, I modify a model developed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). In their model
an individual can borrow for investment purposes up to a certain parameter (λ) times the
individual’s personal asset holdings (z). If an individual’s investment needs are smaller
than λz he is ﬁnancially unconstrained. Choosing entrepreneurship stems purely from the
wealth (asset holdings) constraint on investment. The model does not allow for a time
dimension and has the parameter λ ≥ 1 being the same for everyone.
Let λz be the borrowing capacity of an individual. Unlike in the Evans-Jovanovic
model, λ is not treated as a parameter. A general form of the borrowing capacity allows for
heterogeneity of borrowers not only with respect to their asset holdings (as in Evans and
Jovanovic) but also with respect to their personal characteristics, based on which, banks
may discriminate against borrowers. If banks employ any form of discrimination, these
factors would decrease the borrowing capacity of a discriminated group. The borrowing
capacity also depends on a parameter which captures the ability of banks to grant credit.
A more formal description of the model is provided below.
An individual lives for t=0, 1, 2, .... He or she divides total available time for working
(normalized to 1) between his/her own business activity Lt, and time of working for some-
body else, (1−Lt).18 His/her utility is a linear function of consumption, Ct, and work. An






βt (Ct − η1Lt − η2(1 − Lt)), (1)
where E0 is the expectations operator conditional on time t0 information set Ω0. η1 and η2
are disutility coeﬃcients of being self-employed or working for somebody else respectively.
β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1). At each time t, an individual is able to invest in his or
her own business. Working for a wage, individual earns wt(1 − Lt), where wt is wage rate
if the person is employed by somebody else. Working for himself/herself, he/she earns an





θ is a measure of “entrepreneurial abilities.” I assume an individual knows the level of
18For simplicity I assume that total hours of work are constant for every period. Unemployment is not
an option.
19For use of a similar function see for example Sch¨ afer and Talavera (2005).
20Evans and Jovanovic (1989) does not allow entrepreneurial income to depend on hours worked.
10his/her θ prior to making a business decision. θ remains ﬁxed over time for simplicity.21 If
an individual realizes that he/she does not have any entrepreneurial abilities, he/she does
not become self-employed, spends the entire time working for somebody else and receives
Yt = 0 (his/her wage income will be wt). For an individual with at least some positive θ,
It−1 is the amount invested into the business in the period t-1, marginal returns to business-
labor and investment are 0 < α < 1 and 0 < γ < 1 respectively, and ξ is a log–normal
disturbance whose logarithm has a mean of one and variance σ2
ξ. At the time when the
investment decision is made, the risk–neutral person does not know the realization of ξt.
An individual chooses (Ct,Lt) to maximize his/her utility function (1) subject to the
budget constraint
Ct + It = (Yt + wt(1 − Lt)) + (1 + rt)(St−1 − It−1) + (It − St), (3)
where (Yt+wt(1−Lt)) is the total income earned at time t, and rt is gross interest rate.22 I
allow an individual to have either one or both types of jobs (working for somebody else and
himself/herself) at the same time. St is the amount saved before the the investment is made
at time t, It is investment prepared for the next period. (St−1 −It−1) and (It −St) are the
amounts of net borrowing in the previous and current period respectively. Assume default
is not an option. The amount of expenses in period t, (Ct + It), equalizes the amount of
inﬂow coming from the return on entrepreneurship, wage income, and net assets.
If an individual can borrow “unlimited” funds for his investment projects, he is ﬁnan-
cially unconstrained. For some upper limit of available funds (F) for a particular investment
project, such an entrepreneur would always face (It − St) < F. I denote F the “borrowing
capacity.”23 In this model it depends on the total assets (wealth/savings) that an en-
trepreneur possesses (for collateral purposes) St, level of screening a ﬁnancial intermediary
can perform to identify good projects, ability and willingness to ﬁnance riskier projects,
and the overall lending capacity in the “local” economy (φ). If ﬁnancial intermediaries are
discriminating against any group(s) of borrowers with some particular characteristics, the
borrowing capacity would depend on these also. If the borrowing plans of an entrepreneur
exceed his borrowing capacity, he is ﬁnancially constrained. More formally, for both (con-
strained and unconstrained) cases, the net borrowing is limited by the following:
(It − St) ≤ F, (4)
21There are models that allow individuals to learn their entrepreneurial abilities with time (see for example
Jovanovic (1982)).
22For simplicity, I assume that lending and borrowing interest rates are equal. When (St−1 − It−1) is
negative, an individual lends this funds at time t − 1.
23The function F here is a direct analog of λz in Jovanovic (1982).
11where F = 1
D St Φ(φ), D is a factor that “measures” discrimination. If ﬁnancial institutions
(banks) employ any taste-based discrimination strategies, the parameter D will be greater
than one and it will reduce the borrowing capacity of a borrower. In summary, borrowing
capacity F increases with the level of assets St and the banking parameter φ, and decreases
with the discrimination parameter D. More formally, ∂F
∂St > 0, ∂F
∂D < 0, ∂F
∂φ > 0, and
dΦ
dφ > 0.
An individual maximizes his/her utility function (1) with respect to the level of current
consumption and labor hours subject to three constraints (equations 2, 3, and 4), when the
transversality condition (which prevents the person from borrowing an inﬁnite amount and









(IT − ST) = 0 (5)








t = λt/β + rt+1 (7)
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Intuition suggests that the individual would change the hours devoted to his/her business
when the degree of ﬁnancial constraints changes. As shown in equation (11) below, when
the level of ﬁnancial constraints decreases (φ and, as a consequence,F(·) increases), the
























(1 − γ − α)










To the extent that the borrowing capacity F is an increasing function of φ, (γ+α) < 1, and
(wt+η1) > η2, an individual will always ﬁnd it optimal to increase his/her self-employment
labor input after banking system consolidation.
7 Empirical Analysis
7.1 Data
I use a panel of variables for the 50 U.S. states minus Delaware and South Dakota for the
period 1980–2000.24 Below, I describe the main sources of data and the methodology used
to construct the variables used in the analysis.
Income (total and components): I use the March Supplement of the Consumer Population
Survey (CPS) for the years 1980–2001 to construct the growth rates for the total income
and various income components of states. I restrict the age range of individuals to 18–63
years, which corresponds to 1–40 years of potential experience of workers. The resulting
sample size is over two million individuals. Income variables in the CPS in the current
year t corresponds to the previous year’s income. Wage Income is the total (aggregated)
wage earned by all individuals residing in state i at time t. Self-employment income is
deﬁned similarly using the self-employment component of income earned by individuals
working in state i at time t. Self-employment income is the amount received from his/her
own business after expenses (therefore, this causes some observations to be either near zero
or even negative). Individuals are allowed to have both types of jobs (wage and business).
State-level Earnings is deﬁned as the sum of wage and self-employment income components
for state i, year t. March supplemental weights are used to make the individual-level data
set representative for each state.
Individual Characteristics: Individuals’ level of education, type of employment, age, gender,
and race are taken from the March Supplement of the Consumer population Survey (CPS)
for the years 1980–2001.
State Gross Domestic Product: I use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data for
gross state domestic product which is deﬁned as the “value added” of the industries of a
24I exclude Delaware and South Dakota from the sample due to laws that provide tax incentives for credit
card banks to operate there. As a result, the banking industry in these states grew much faster than other
states in the 1980s. I start my sample in 1980 as the number of self-employed individuals interviewed in
CPS by states is much smaller for years before 1980. In addition, the CPS deﬁnitions of the self-employment
income component changed starting the year 1980.
13state deﬂated by the consumer price index to obtain real per capital state gross domestic
product (gross state product).
Intrastate Branching Restrictions: I measure the direct eﬀect of deregulation as an indica-
tor variable which equals zero in states/years where intrastate branching restrictions were
in place. I follow the practice of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Kroszner and Stra-
han (1999), and focus on branching deregulation through mergers and acquisitions allowing
multi-bank holding companies to convert subsidiaries into branches. Dates for deregulation
reform are taken from Kroszner and Strahan.
Small Business Administration (SBA) Guaranteed Loans: I use the amount of loans issued
by commercial banks that were guaranteed by the SBA. Such guarantees—according to
the section 7(a) of the Small Business Act—are called “7(a) Loan Guarantees.” They help
qualiﬁed small businesses obtain ﬁnancing when they might not be eligible for business
loans through normal lending channels. Loan proceeds can be used for most sound busi-
ness purposes including working capital, machinery and equipment, furniture and ﬁxtures,
land and building. Loan maturity is up to 10 years for working capital and up to 25 years
for ﬁxed assets. Data source: the Small Business Administration (www.sba.gov)
7.2 Descriptive Statistics
As shown in Table and 1, 10 percent of the entire labor force is self-employed. Among
them, almost 70 percent are males and about 30 percent are females. Among all self-
employed about 90 percent are whites and almost 10 percent are non-whites. Thirty six
percent of self-employed have both types of income: income from self-employment and wage
income. Sixty four percent of self-employed have self-employment income only (and zero
wage income).
The share of self-employed non-white minorities in the labor force is very small (1 per-
cent). In addition to the problems associated with the small sample size for this group,
there is a substantial number of missing state/year observations for self-employment income.
Twenty-eight states had more than 2 missing observations from 1980 to 2000 making it im-
possible to calculate self-employment income growth rates. I drop these states, whenever I
analyze self-employment income of non-whites (and of whites to make the results compara-
ble). The remaining partial sample consists of the following (20) states: Alabama, Alaska,
California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Washington. Seven states in this list deregulated before 1980 (the beginning
14of my sample) and 13 states deregulated after the year 1980. These 20 states constitute
64% of the U.S. economy.
As reported in Table 2 (column one), average self-employment income for men ($13,786)
is almost twice as large as average self-employment income for women ($7,129). The average
self-employment income of whites ($12,571) is also almost twice as large as that of non-
whites ($6,860). Average incomes are expressed in terms of 1984 dollars. The numbers
reported are similar to those calculated earlier by Becker (1984) and Bearse (1984).
Column two of Table 2 shows that there is almost no discernable diﬀerence between
average self-employment incomes earned by diﬀerent demographic groups at the lower end
of the (total) income distribution: Females earn on average about $1000 more than men
and non-whites earn about $700 less than whites. However, as reported in column three
of Table 2, males earn almost twice as much as females at the upper end of the income
distribution; whites earn on average almost 1.5 times that of non-whites at the upper end
of the income distribution.
7.3 Empirical Strategy
For the empirical analysis I concentrate on the possible eﬀects of the intrastate bank branch-
ing reform via mergers and acquisitions (as opposed to interstate banking via bank holding
companies). As noted in the literature, it is intrastate branching reform that led to the
most sizable changes in market structure (McLaughlin (1995)). At the same time, Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996) show that both total states’ income and GSP per capita grew faster
following intrastate branching reform.
The borrowing capacity of a potential entrepreneur (Equation (4) in Section 6 above),
among other factors, depends on a the discrimination parameter. If banks discriminate
against (or in favor of) a certain group of borrowers based on some non-economic factors,
these factors would determine the size and the sign of the discrimination parameter.
As mentioned in the Section 4 above, banks tend to discriminate on the basis of race,
gender, and current income of (potential) borrowers.25
I hypothesize that females, non-whites, and individuals earning “insuﬃcient” current
income were constrained in terms of their borrowing abilities before banking deregulation.
This hypothesis would not be rejected if removal of the restrictions on banking improves
banking ability to grant a credit and loosens the borrowing limit constraint for this groups of
25There seem to be two more candidates for the possible discrimination criteria: age and education.
Perhaps younger and/or less educated individuals would seem less reliable business owners in the eyes of
lenders. I limit my analysis to analyzing individuals older than 18, and younger than 64—so that age
becomes less of an issue. Moreover, based on a study of credit-constrained consumers (Perraudin and
Sorensen (1992)), decisions of banks on whether to grant a loan seem to be independent of the level of
education of applicants.
15individuals. Unconstrained individuals will be either unaﬀected by deregulation or they will
also face more “freedom” in terms of their borrowing plans. If improvements in the post-
reform banking sector had an impact on borrowing capacity, we will be able to empirically
observe it by looking at the constrained group (not at the unconstrained group, since
unconstrained individuals were such even before deregulation).
I use the median of the overall income distribution as a threshold for measuring “suﬃ-
ciency” of current income. For each state/year I rank the entire population of individuals
by their total income and then split the sample by the median (and by quartiles for ro-
bustness). To obtain a unit of observations for the lower end of the income distribution,
for example, for each state i, year t, I sum up corresponding income components of all
individuals in the labor force from age 18 to 63 if they received total incomes less than
the 50th percentile, divide by the corresponding CPI and scale by the total labor force in
that state/year. I further split my sample by gender and race. Individuals receiving total
income below (above) the median income are labelled as “Lower 50%” (“Upper 50%”) in
the tables discussed in Section 7.4 below.
7.4 Results and Discussion
Deregulation and Self-Employment Income
The bench-mark regressions I run for the empirical analysis are the following:
INCit = αconst + βi + βt + β DEREGit + εit, (12)
where INCit is the growth rate of either total income or income components for state i
and year t. DEREGit is an indicator variable which equals zero in state/years where banking
restrictions were in place. I weight all observations by the square roots of the number
of individual-level observations. I also control for autocorrelation by the Prais-Winsten
procedure, and allow for time heteroscedasticity. Inclusion of both cross-sectional and time
ﬁxed eﬀects is crucial for the analysis. I investigate the eﬀect of bank branching reform on
the state-speciﬁc income growth rates excluding such eﬀects as general (U.S. wide) rise in
female- and minority-participation in the labor force, and business cycle.
Table 3 (column one) shows that income growth rates of states increased by slightly
more than one-half of one percent following bank branching deregulation. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the results of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). By comparing the impact
of branching deregulation on diﬀerent income components (columns two through four), an
interesting ﬁnding emerges. Income from self-employment increased more than three times
16as much as total income, earnings, and wages.26 This ﬁnding indicates that branching
deregulation had a substantially larger eﬀect on average self-employed than on the average
wage-worker.
Comparing income from self-employment for diﬀerent groups of individuals, I run re-
gressions (12) substituting INCit with the growth rates of (real, per capita) income from
self-employment for corresponding sub-samples.
As shown in Table 4, only the lower half of the distribution of discriminated groups is
aﬀected by the removal of banking restrictions. The growth rate of female self-employment
income in the lower half of the distribution increased by almost 16%. This result is very
large in economic terms, but the lower bound of the conﬁdence interval seems reasonable.
The growth rate of non-white self-employment income component in the lower half of the
distribution increased by more than 2%.27 At the same time, the eﬀect of reform on the
diﬀerent portions of income distribution among males and among whites is not substantial.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the hypothesis that pre-reform relatively poor females
and non-white minorities were the most constrained in terms of their borrowing ability. It
may indicate that discrimination in lending against them was taking place. Consolidation
in the banking industry following branching deregulation appears to have mitigated the
discrimination to some degree.
Personal income may not be a perfect measure of how poor individuals are. For lenders,
what may matter more is the household income to determine whether a borrower is able to
repay his or her debt. It is especially true for females who should not be considered poor
if they have zero or very small income but are married to a person whose income is not
small. To make sure the previous result was not capturing the eﬀect of deregulation on
rich housewives (females with zero personal income and high household income), I perform
the analysis summarized in the Table 4 above, splitting the sample by household income
(instead of personal income). Similarly to the previous analysis, I use a median oh household
income as a threshold.
26The eﬀect of banking reform on dividends, interest, and rental income is beyond the scope of the current
paper.
27The result is based on the partial sample of 20 states. See Section 7.2 for more detailed description.
In order to examine if the results are robust, I test for the eﬀect of deregulation on the self-employment
income component in three complementary ways. I modify my sub-samples of data as follows. For the ﬁrst
method, I keep all the missing observations and assign a small number to each missing point. If there are no
non-white self-employed interviewed in some state/year I assign that state to have $100 (in current dollars)
as a self-employment income component (it’s $100 for the entire state). For the second method, I drop the
state/year observations that have a self-employment income component equal to zero and use the resulting
unbalanced panel. For the method three, I simply drop the states with missing observations completely.
Based on these three modiﬁed data sets I run the regressions (12). In all cases I smooth observations using
the Kernel Smoother (with σ = 2). All three methods produce quantitatively similar results. Method three,
however, produces the most qualitatively meaningful results. Therefore, only the results based on the latter
method are reported.
17As shown in Table 5, consistent with the previous ﬁnding, the personal self-employment
income of females whose household income is below the median household income were
aﬀected the most following removal of banking restrictions. According to the point esti-
mate, following deregulation self-employment income growth rate increased by 5.17%. The
economic magnitude of this result is realistic, and the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. The coeﬃcients for other sub-groups of labor force are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero.
As another robustness check, I include the amount of SBA-guaranteed loans28 as a
dependent variable into regressions (12). As shown in Table 6, the main result of the
paper—the positive eﬀect of reform on relatively poor women and minorities—remains
even after controlling for the subsidized SBA-loans.
I compare the eﬀect of banking reform on self-employment income with the eﬀects
on wages and total income. As reported in Table 7, there is no substantial diﬀerence in
the eﬀects of bank branching deregulation on wage-income of the diﬀerent portions of the
income distribution. There are also no diﬀerences by race and gender. Even though there
is a positive eﬀect from deregulation on the average wage income component (as shown
in Table 3), there is no diﬀerential impact on any speciﬁc groups of the labor force under
consideration. As a robustness check, I performed the same analysis based on the sample
split by the quartiles of the income distribution (instead of a median). The general pattern
of the results is preserved (the results are not reported).
The results for females and non-white minorities based on total income are similar to
those based on self-employment income. As reported in Table 8, following banking reform,
the total income growth rate for the lower portion of income distribution is increased for
both females and non-whites, and those of the upper part of the distribution were not
aﬀected signiﬁcantly.29
Deregulation and Self-Employment Rate
As mentioned in Section 3, the self-employment participation rate has been trending up-
wards since 1970. In addition to the positive trend, I ﬁnd that following banking deregu-
lation the share of non-farm (incorporated and unincorporated together) self-employed in
28See Section 7.1 for the variable deﬁnition.
29There is, however, an additional ﬁnding that emerges from the results reported in the Table 8. According
to the point estimates, total income growth (for all individuals in the labor force) of both the lower and
the upper halves of the income distribution increased following banking reform. The eﬀect on the lower
portion is almost twice as large as on the upper portion but the diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients is
not statistically signiﬁcant. The same pattern is observed for all white individuals. Since the total income
includes many components besides wage- and self-employment income, the mechanisms through which
banking reform might have aﬀected the overall income growth rates for whites and/or males is beyond the
scope of the current paper.














is either a fraction of all self-employed or of a speciﬁc sub-group of
all self-employed (males, females, whites, and non-whites) in the labor force. I control for
a regular (U.S. wide) trend, state speciﬁc trends, and state-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, following
a practice of Black and Strahan (2001). Shares of self-employed in the labor force might
be strongly trending, and these trends may vary across the states.31 Column one of the
Table 9 summarizes the results. According to the point estimate (row one), the share of
all (non-farm) self-employed in the labor force increased after reform by a quarter of one
percent. A similar result is found for the proportion of white self-employed. The share
of non-white self-employed in the labor force is also positively aﬀected by reform (row
ﬁve), but the impact is not signiﬁcant. Comparing the changes in male- and female self-
employment participation rates (rows two and three) we observe an increase only in the
ratio of female self-employed (the share of male self-employed did not change substantially
following reform).
For robustness, column two of the Table 9 shows results based on the shares of particular
group self-employed relative to the same group of labor force participation (not total labor
force). For example, in row two the coeﬃcient shows that share of male self-employed
relative to the male labor force increased by 0.16%. The coeﬃcient is not statistically
signiﬁcant, as in the column one. The only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect is observed for
female and white portions of corresponding parts of the labor force (the same pattern as in
column one). According to the point estimates, the share of self-employed females in the
female labor force increased by 0.31% and the share of white self-employed in the white
portion of the labor force increased by 0.26 %.
30Black and Strahan (2002) for example ﬁnd that there are more new incorporations emerging following
banking reforms.
31Controlling for time and state-by-time ﬁxed eﬀects instead of trend and state-speciﬁc trends produces
similar results.
198 Conclusions
This paper shows that interstate bank branching deregulation had a positive impact on
self-employment for relatively poor women and minorities.
There are on average fewer self-employed women and minorities—and they earn on
average much less—than, correspondingly, men and white individuals possibly due to dis-
crimination in the both labor and credit markets. Banking reform seems to have mitigated
discrimination in lending and increased credit availability for the previously-discriminated
groups. As a result, the growth rate of self-employment income for these groups increased.
Importantly, this paper shows that it is deregulation, and not direct government subsi-
dies to banks for ﬁnancing small businesses, that positively inﬂuenced self-employment of
previously discriminated women and minorities.
The obtained results demonstrate that the state-speciﬁc changes in the banking struc-
ture after removing branching restrictions had a positive impact on historically underserved
groups of individuals. This impact should be taken into consideration when analyzing direct
eﬀects of country-wide laws (such as ECOA and CRA).
The ﬁndings of this paper may have important implications for other countries be-
sides the United States as many economies are now committed to removing barriers across
banking sectors.
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Note: “Self-employed” individuals are deﬁned as either incorporated or non-incorporated,
non-farm self-employed. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District of Columbia,
Delaware, and South Dakota are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data Source: March
Supplement of the Consumer Population Survey. Individual-level data is aggregated to the
state/year level using the March Supplement weights. Age of the labor force is restricted
to 18–63 years. See Section 7.1 above for detailed variable deﬁnitions.
26Table 2: Descriptive statistics: average self-employment income by demographic groups
Total sample Lower 50% Upper 50%
Self-employment income of individuals 14,667 2,790 26,543
Self-employment income of men 13,786 2,182 25,391
Self-employment income of women 7,129 3,244 11,014
Self-employment income of whitesa 12,571 2,149 22,993
Self-employment income of non-whitesa 6,860 1,462 16,122
Note: Data source is the March Supplement of the Consumer Population Survey (CPS) for
the years 1980–2000. The numbers correspond to average income from self-employment (in
terms of 1984 dollars) for the corresponding groups of the labor force.
a: based on a limited number of states (Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Car-
olina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington). See
Section 7.3 for discussion. See Section 7.1 above for more detailed variable deﬁnitions and
discussion.
27Table 3: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation on the Growth Rates of Income Components
income earnings self-empl. wage
income
Total Sample 0.65 0.69 2.39 0.61
(0.30) (0.31) (1.86) (0.33)
Note: The results are based on the following Weighted Least Square regressions:
INCit = αconst+βi +βt +β DEREGit +εit, where DEREGit is a dummy variable. It equals
zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector were in place (for
state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation. Dates of deregulation are available
in Kroszner and Strahan (1999). INCit is the growth rate of a corresponding (real, per
capita) income component. For example, the results in the ﬁrst column are the estimates
of the coeﬃcient β based on the regression where the dependent variable in the total
income growth. The estimate in the second column is based on the regression with the
growth rate of earnings as the dependent variable. The estimates in the columns four and
ﬁve are obtained similarly using the growth rates of self-employment and wage income
components. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District of Columbia, Delaware, and
South Dakota are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data source: March Supplement
of the Consumer Population Survey. Age of the labor force is restricted to 18–63 years.
Standard errors are in parentheses. All coeﬃcients and standard errors are multiplied by
100.
28Table 4: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation on Self-Employment Income Growth Rates.
Sample Split by the Median of Total Personal Income







Non − whitesa 2.38 –1.99
(1.04) (1.50)
Note: The results are from the following Weighted Least Square regressions:
SELFINCit = α const + αi + αt + β DEREGit + εit, where DEREGit is a dummy variable. It
equals zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector were in place
(for state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation. Dates of deregulation are
available in Kroszner and Strahan (1999). SELFINC is the growth rate of the income from
self-employment of a corresponding group of the labor force. Each cell reports ˆ β from a
separate regression. For example, in row one, column one, the group consists of relatively
poor males in state i and year t; in row one, column two—relatively rich males, etc. Data
sample consists of U.S. states (District of Columbia, Delaware, and South Dakota are
excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data Source: March Supplement of the Consumer
Population Survey. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a – the coeﬃcient is obtained using the partial sample of states. See section (7) for more
details,
b - for whites, the coeﬃcients based on the total sample of states are similar to those
reported.
29Table 5: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation on Self-Employment Income Growth Rates.
Sample Split by the Median of Total Household Income





Note: The results are from the following Weighted Least Square regressions:
SELFINCit = α const + αi + αt + β DEREGit + εit, where DEREGit is a dummy variable.
It equals zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector were in
place (for state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation. Dates of deregulation
are available in Kroszner and Strahan (1999). SELFINC is the growth rate of the income
from self-employment of a corresponding group of the labor force. Each cell reports ˆ β
from a separate regression. For example, in row one, column one, the group consists of
relatively poor males in state i and year t; in row one, column two—relatively rich males,
etc. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District of Columbia, Delaware, and South Dakota
are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data Source: March Supplement of the Consumer
Population Survey. Standard errors are in parentheses.
30Table 6: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation via Mergers and Acquisitions on Self-
Employment Income Growth Rates. Sample Split by the Median of Total Income. Control
for the Level of SBA-Protected Loans







Non − whitesa 2.59 –1.99
(1.08) (1.54)
Note: The results for columns one and three are from the following Weighted Least Square
(WLS) regressions: SELFINCit = α const+αi+αt+β DEREGit+γ SBA+εit, where DEREGit
is a dummy variable. It equals zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the
banking sector were in place (for state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation.
Dates of deregulation are available in Kroszner and Strahan (1999). SBA is the level
of Small Business Administration Guaranteed Loans and SELFINC is the growth rate of
the income from self-employment of a corresponding group of the labor force. Each cell
reports ˆ β from a separate regression. For example, in row one, column one, the group
consists of relatively poor males in state i and year t; in row one, column two—relatively
rich males, etc. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District of Columbia, Delaware, and
South Dakota are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data Source: March Supplement of
the Consumer Population Survey. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a – the coeﬃcient is obtained using the partial sample of states. b - for whites, the
coeﬃcients based on the total sample of states are similar to those reported.
31Table 7: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation on Wage Income Growth Rates. Sample
Split by the Median of Total Income
Sub-sample Lower 50% Upper 50%










Note: The results are from the following Weighted Least Squares regressions:
WAGEit = α const + αi + αt + β DEREGit + εit, where DEREGit is a dummy variable. It
equals zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector were in place
(for state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation. Dates of deregulation are
available in Kroszner and Strahan (1999). WAGE is the growth rate of the income from
working for a wage of a corresponding group of the labor force. Each cell reports ˆ β
from a separate regression. For example, in row one, column one, the group consists of
relatively poor individuals (both males and females) in state i and year t; in row one,
column two—relatively rich individuals, etc. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District
of Columbia, Delaware, and South Dakota are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data
Source: March Supplement of the Consumer Population Survey. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
32Table 8: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation on Total Income Growth Rates. Sample
Split by the Median of Total Income
Sub-sample Lower 50% Upper 50%










Note: The results are from the following Weighted Least Square regressions:
INCit = α const + αi + αt + β DEREGit + εit, where DEREGit is a dummy variable. It
equals zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector were in place
(for state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation. Dates of deregulation are
available in Kroszner and Strahan (1999). INC is the growth rate of the (real per capita)
personal (total) income of a corresponding group of the labor force. Each cell reports
ˆ β from a separate regression. For example, in row one, column one, the group consists
of relatively poor individuals (both males and females) in state i and year t; in row one,
column two—relatively rich individuals, etc. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District
of Columbia, Delaware, and South Dakota are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data
Source: March Supplement of the Consumer Population Survey. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
33Table 9: The Eﬀect of Intrastate Deregulation on the Share of Self-Employed in the Labor





























= const + trend + βi + βi trend + β DEREGit + εit, where DEREGit is a
dummy variable. It equals zero if restrictions on mergers and acquisitions in the banking
sector were in place (for state i in the year t) and equals one after deregulation. Dates of







of a particular group of self-employed in either the entire labor force (column one) or in a
corresponding part of the labor force (column two). Each cell reports ˆ β from a separate
regression. For example, in row one, the group consists of all self-employed individuals
(both males and females) in state i and year t; in row two—the group is females who earn
self-employment income, etc. Data sample consists of U.S. states (District of Columbia,
Delaware, and South Dakota are excluded) for the years 1980–2000. Data Source: March
Supplement of the Consumer Population Survey. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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